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Hellraisers Journal – Monday July 28, 1902
Parkersburg, West Virginia – Judge Jackson re “Organizers” and “Agitators”
From The Pittsburg Press of July 24, 1902:
JUDGE WAS SEVERE ON MINERS
[…]
Parkersburg, W. Va., July 24.-There was the most intense interest in the crowded room of the United States District Court this morning when Judge Jackson began reading his lengthy decision declaring “Mother” Mary Jones, the angel of the miners, and seven other organizers of the United Mine Workers and four Hungarians to be guilty of contempt of disregarding his injunction of June 19, against holding a meeting or creating a demonstration at or near the Pinnickinnick mine of the Clarksburg Fuel Co., or near the residence of miners at work. Judge Jackson, after concluding his decision, sentenced the defendants as follows:
Thomas Haggerty, 90 days in jail; Wm. Morgan, Bernard Rice, Peter Wilson, Wm. Blakeley, George Bacon, Thomas Laskavish, 60 days each. “Mother” Jones’ sentence was passed till afternoon. It is said she will receive a stiff fine and will not be jailed. Albert Repake, Joseph and George Roeski and Steve Teonike, Hungarians, passed until the afternoon session……
[Photograph and emphasis added.]
Ruling of Judge Jackson, July 24, 1902:
UNITED STATES ex rel. GUARANTY TRUST CO. of NEW YORK
v. HAGGERTY et al.
(Circuit Court, N. D. West Virginia. July 24, 1902.)[Part I of II]
1. INJUNCTION.—GROUNDS—COMBINATION TO INDUCE STRIKES.
The power of a court of equity may be invoked to restrain and inhibit by injunction a combination which is formed to induce employes who are not dissatisfied with the terms of their employment to strike for the purpose of inflicting injury and damage upon the employers.
2. SAME.
While employes have the right to quit their employment whenever they desire, unless contractual relations exist between them and their employers which should control such right, the action of third persons, having no interest in the contracts between workmen and their employers, in conspiring to control the action of the workmen and to induce them to strike by means of threats, intimidation, or a resort to any other modes usually employed in such cases, is an illegal and malicious interference with the employer’s business, which a court of equity may properly enjoin where it is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.
3. SAME—Violation—CONTEMPT OF COURT.
Defendants, who were alleged to be unlawfully interfering with the business of a coal company and its employes by attempting to incite the latter to strike, were enjoined from assembling together, in camp or otherwise, at or near the mines of the company, or at or so near the residences of its employes, as to disturb, alarm, or intimidate such employes, so as to prevent them from working in the mines, or to prevent or interfere with them in passing to or from their work at the mines, or in otherwise interfering with them as the employes of the company.
After being served with the injunction, defendants assembled and held an open-air meeting within 1,000 feet from the opening of the mine, and within 300 to 400 feet from the residences of the miners, and in plain view of both. It was also near where the miners were obliged to pass in going to and from their work, and 150 feet from the company’s property. At such meeting violent speeches were made by defendants, in which they stated that the injunction did not amount to anything, and would not stop them; that, if they were arrested, others would take their places; and they criticised the court for granting an injunction, stating that the judge was a tool of the company, and no attention should be paid to his order, but that the miners should be made to lay down their tools and come out. It was shown that such meeting disturbed the miners, who were afraid of violence, and that the works would be blown up; that they had no disagreement with their employer, and a large majority of them did not desire to strike, but many said they would quit work unless they could be protected.
Held, that such action by defendants was a violation of the injunction, and a contempt of court.
On Rule for Contempt.
Reese Blizzard, U. S. Dist. Atty., A. B. Fleming, W. S. Meredith, John W. Davis, and E. F. Hartley, for the rule.
V. B. Archer, John J. Coniff, Charles D. Johnson, and A. G. Fickeison, for defendants.
JACKSON, District Judge.
Upon the 19th day of June, 1902, the Guaranty Trust Company of New York filed its bill, duly sworn to and verified by the affidavit of R. J. Jones, the company’s agent, in the circuit court of the United States for the Northern district of West Virginia, against Thomas Haggerty and others, defendants, some of whom are citizens and residents of the state of Pennsylvania, some of the state of Illinois, others of the state of Ohio, and others who are citizens and residents of the state of West Virginia. The bill alleges that the Clarksburg Fuel Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of West Virginia, and doing business in said state, with its principal office or place of business at Clarksburg, W. Va.
It is alleged that the Clarksburg Fuel Company is the owner of a large number of mines and mining plants; that it owns in fee simple about 3,800 acres of coal land; that it also controls about 2,200 acres of coal land by virtue of leases executed to it; that it is engaged in mining coal and manufacturing coke, and shipping the same to the open market in the United States of America; that the product of said company’s mines is large, amounting to about 4,000 tons per day; that it has customers residing in all parts of the United States; that a large portion of its trade is during the summer months in the Northwest, and the coal is carried to that region by steamers upon the Lakes, and can only be carried in the season that navigation is not interrupted by ice; that the company has made large contracts for the future delivery of coal; and that its profits and earnings depend largely, if not altogether, upon its mining and producing coal during the summer season of the year.
The bill alleges and avers that, to enable the Clarksburg Fuel Company to successfully carry on its business and pay for the many improvements made by it in operating its mines, it was compelled to execute a mortgage or deed of trust to the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, the plaintiff in this action, on the 26th day of September, 1901, to secure the payment of bonds amounting to $2,500,000, which is evidenced by 2,500 bonds of the denomination of $1,000, each, and that 500 of said bonds have been sold or pledged as security for their loans or indebtedness, so that the said company became indebted by virtue of the said mortgage or deed of trust and the issuing of said bonds to the full amount of $1,450,000, due and payable on the 1st day of October, 1931, which indebtedness still exists, and is secured by the mortgage referred to. That by the terms of the said mortgage the company is to pay 6 per cent. interest semiannually upon this debt, and, in the event of a default to pay the said interest when it becomes due, the whole indebtedness becomes due and payable.
The bill alleges that the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, the plaintiff in this action, is the trustee in the mortgage, and has loaned the Clarksburg Fuel Company $950,000. To guaranty and secure the payment of said loan, the said Clarksburg Fuel Company executed to the plaintiff its note for $950,000, and has deposited as collateral with the Guaranty Trust Company of New York 2,000 of said bonds of the aggregate value of $2,000,000, payable on the 1st day of October, 1931, as a security and indemnity of this loan, and that the said interest has been paid up to the time of the filing of this bill, but no provision has been made for the accruing interest; that the Clarksburg Fuel Company will not be able to pay, from its earnings or otherwise, the interest accruing upon said bonds, except from the income which may be derived from the operation of its several mines and the product of those plants, and, in the event that the mines and plants should be closed, or partially closed, or seriously injured, or destroyed, the plaintiff alleges and believes that the interest which will hereafter become due will not be paid.
The bill alleges that there is a general strike in the anthracite regions of the state of Pennsylvania, in which a large number of persons are involved, said to be 100,000 or more in number; that recently the person or persons at the head of the organization known as the United Mine Workers of America have announced their intention to cause or create a strike among the miners of the soft coal regions of the United States, and more particularly in the state of West Virginia, for the purpose of aiding the strike prevailing in the state of Pennsylvania, and to prevent the shipment of coal to localities that have been heretofore supplied with coal from the anthracite regions in the state of Pennsylvania; that for this reason the defendants Thomas Haggerty, Thomas Burke, Bernard Rice, William Morgan, Edward McKay, and Mary, alias “Mother,” Jones, all nonresidents of the state of West Virginia, who are known as “organizers,” “agitators,” and “walking delegates,” representing the United Mine Workers of America, have come into the state of West Virginia to create strikes among the coal miners or persons engaged in their trades or occupations, and whose particular business it is alleged is to effect a strike among the miners and employes of the said Clarksburg Fuel Company in and about its various mines.
It is alleged that the defendants Haggerty and Jones addressed various meetings composed in part of coal miners, in which they attempted, in connection with the other defendants, to inflame and excite the hatred and animosity of the miners towards the proprietors of the coal mines, especially towards the persons connected with the Clarksburg Fuel Company and the Fairmont Coal Company, and in their speeches advised the miners to quit their work; that in some instances the miners have been assaulted by the strikers, and that in one instance a mine belonging to the Clarksburg Fuel Company was attempted to be blown up, and by the use of explosives the main head of the West Fork mine was blown up for a distance of some 50 feet, which entirely suspended operations in said mine; that the blowing up of said mine had a very bad effect upon all of the employes of the Clarksburg Fuel Company, which tended to intimidate those who were working in the mines, and to prevent them from continuing their work.
The bill contains many other allegations of a similar character, alleging that there is a combination of persons engaged in marching and passing by the mines and property of the Clarksburg Fuel Company, who held a meeting near one of the largest mines of the Clarksburg Fuel Company, the sole purpose being to alarm, intimidate, and frighten the miners working for the Clarksburg Fuel Company. The bill also charges a combination and conspiracy entered into by the defendants, with others, to bring about a strike; that, as a result of the acts of the conspirators, agitators, walking delegates, and strikers that some of the employes have been induced to strike, although most of them preferred to work and remain in the employment of the company, if they could be protected.
The bill is quite lengthy, and contains many other statements, which the court deems unnecessary to notice, contenting itself with a substantial synopsis of the bill as herein stated. The prayer of this bill is to enjoin and restrain the defendants from entering and trespassing upon the lands and property of the Clarksburg Fuel Company; and to restrain them from going on or about the said company’s tipples, tracks, or other property, together or individually, so long as they are not in the employment of the said company for the purpose of unlawfully preventing said company’s employes in engaging and remaining in its employment; that the defendants, and each of them, be enjoined and restrained from assembling, congregating, or camping at or near the plants, mines, and places of business of the said company’s property, or at or near the residences of the said employes, and the paths and roads traveled by the said employes in going to and returning from their work, for the purpose of preventing the employes of the Clarksburg Fuel Company from entering into or continuing in said company’s employment by intimidation, threats, or otherwise, whether by physical force or otherwise, and whether by actual threats or otherwise to the person, property, or families of the said employes; that they be restrained from unlawfully interfering with the management of the business of the company; that the defendants, their confederates and their associates, be, each and all of them, enjoined from assembling together in camp or otherwise, near the mines of the company, or near the residences of its employes, whereby they would be disturbed, alarmed, or intimidated from working in the mines, and preventing them from passing to and from their houses to the mines, or from doing any personal injury to the person of the employes of the said company or others who are desirous of entering into or remaining in its employment, or interfering in any unlawful way with any person who desires to go into and remain in said company’s employment, and from visiting the houses and places of abode of the persons who are in the employ of the company, who are desirous of remaining in the employment of the company, for the purpose of preventing them by threats, menaces, or actual injury to their person or their property, or to the members of their family.
Upon the filing of this bill, and upon the motion of counsel for the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, the court awarded a temporary restraining order restraining and inhibiting the defendants and all others associated or connected with them from in any way interfering with the management, operation, or conduct of said mines by their owners or those operating them, either by menaces, threats, or any character of intimidation used to prevent the employes of said mines from going to and from said mines and of working in and about said mines; and the defendants are further restrained from entering upon the property of the owners of said Clarksburg Fuel Company for the purpose of interfering with the employes of said company, either by intimidation, or the holding of either public or private assemblages upon said property, or in any wise molesting, interfering with, or intimidating the employes of the Clarksburg Fuel Company, so as to induce them to abandon their work in and about said mines; and the defendants are further restrained from assembling in or near the paths, approaches, and roads upon and near said property leading to and from their homes and residences to the mines, along which the employes of the Clarksburg Fuel Company are compelled to travel to get to and from their work, or from in any way interfering with the employes of said company in passing to and from their work, either by threats, menaces, or intimidation; and the defendants are further restrained from entering the said mines and interfering with the employes in their mining operations within said mines, or assembling upon said property at or near the entrance to said mines, or from marching near to or in sight of said mines, or either of them, or of the residences of the said employes. The defendants are further inhibited and restrained from assembling together, in camp or otherwise, at or near or so near the mines of the Clarksburg Fuel Company, or at or so near the residences of its employes as to disturb, alarm, or intimidate such employes so as to prevent them from working in the mines, or to prevent or interfere with them in passing to and from their work at the mines, or in otherwise interfering with them as the employes of the Clarksburg Fuel Company.
The purpose and object of this restraining order is to prevent all unlawful combinations and conspiracies, and to restrain all the defendants in the promotion of such unlawful combinations and conspiracies from entering upon the property of the Clarksburg Fuel Company described in this order, and from in any wise interfering with the employes of said company in their mining operations, either within the mines or in passing from their homes to the mines and upon their return to their homes, and from unlawfully inciting persons who are engaged in working in the mines from ceasing to work in and about the mines, or in any way advising such acts as may result in violations and destruction of the rights of the Clarksburg Fuel Company.
A copy of this order was served upon the defendants in this case on the 19th and 20th days of June, 1902, prior to the order of arrest, issued in this case for an alleged contempt in violating the restraining order of this court.
The question for this court now to consider is whether or not the defendants violated its order, and, if so, to determine what punishment shall be imposed upon them for its violation. The consideration of this question ordinarily would involve the power of the court to issue injunctions in cases of this character. This court, however, has heretofore upon repeated occasions recognized the power of the court to issue injunctions in cases where there is a combination and conspiracy upon the part of any class of people to prevent them from interfering with the business of others.
What is an injunction? Is it the exercise of an arbitrary power by the courts of the country, or is it a power that has been recognized from a very early date as one of the branches of administrative justice? I answer this question by affirming that the ordinary use of the writ of injunction is to prevent wrongs and injuries to persons and their property, or to reinstate the rights of persons to their property when they have been deprived of it. It is the most efficient, if not the only, remedy to stay irreparable injury, and to punish those who disobey the order of a court granting the writ. In the language of the text-writers, it is prohibitory and restitutory. Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of the writ of injunction, says “that a writ of injunction may be described to be a judicial process, whereby a party is required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ.” A similar writ to this was in use in the days of the Roman empire, and has always been in use in England from the foundation of the common law. It has been in use in this country since the organization of the government.
It is not the exercise of any new power by the court, but it is simply an application of the writ to a new condition of things that exists in our day by reason of the advancement in civilization. It is a mistaken idea to suppose that the courts of this country abuse this writ. In my long experience on the bench I cannot recall a single occasion when any court, either federal or state, ever abused it in what are known as “strike cases.” It is true that our courts have been criticised severely by persons who are inimical to the use of it, and have denounced the courts for “governing by injunctions.” But this criticism is so obviously unjust to the courts that it is unnecessary to enter into any defense of them.
For five or six centuries back it was not an uncommon thing for the courts of our English ancestors to grant a prohibitory writ, as well as a writ of restitution, against persons who combine for any unlawful purpose. It is not my purpose to enter into any lengthy discussion of the remedies by injunction other than to state what seems to me to be the well-settled rule of law in its application to strikes, that the power of the court may be invoked to restrain and inhibit a combination which is formed to induce employes who are not dissatisfied with the terms of their employment to strike for the purpose of inflicting injury and damage upon the employers. I Eddy, Combinations, p. 423, § 525.
[Paragraph breaks and emphasis added.]
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SOURCES
Quote Mother Jones, Injunction Shroud, Bff Exp p7, Apr 24, 1909
https://www.newspapers.com/image/344471675/
The Pittsburg Press
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)
-July 24, 1902
https://www.newspapers.com/image/141914625/
UNITED STATES ex rel. GUARANTY TRUST CO. of NEW YORK
v. HAGGERTY et al.
(Circuit Court, N. D. West Virginia. July 24, 1902.)
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b3556528&view=1up&seq=540&skin=2021&q1=mother%20jones
IMAGE
Judge John Jay Jackson, Cnc Pst p1, July 24, 1902
https://www.newspapers.com/image/761305990
See also:
Tag: Mother Jones v Judge Jackson 1902
https://weneverforget.org/tag/mother-jones-v-judge-jackson-1902/
Tag: West Virginia Coalfield Strike of 1902-1903
https://weneverforget.org/tag/west-virginia-coalfield-strike-of-1902-1903/
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Which Side Are You On? – Tom Morello, The Nightwatchman
Across this great old nation, tell me what you gonna do
When there’s one law for the rulers and one law for the ruled.